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Abstract
How does the formation of cross-country teams aﬀect the organization of work and
the structure of wages? To study this question we propose a theory of the assignment
of heterogeneous agents into hierarchical teams, where less skilled agents specialize in
production and more skilled agents specialize in problem solving. We ﬁrst analyze the
properties of the competitive equilibrium of the model in a closed economy, and show
that the model has a unique and eﬃcient solution. We then study the equilibrium of
a two-country model (North and South), where countries diﬀer in their distributions of
ability, and in which agents in diﬀerent countries can join together in teams. We refer
to this type of integration as globalization. Globalization leads to better matches for
all southern workers but only for the best northern workers. As a result, we show that
globalization increases wage inequality in the South but not necessarily in the North.
We also study how globalization aﬀects the size distribution of ﬁrms and the patterns of
consumption and trade in the global economy.
∗Harvard University, University of Chicago, and Stanford University, respectively. A previous version of this
paper was circulated under the title “Outsourcing in a Knowledge Economy.” We thank seminar participants
at various institutions for very useful comments.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A number of recent technological1 and institutional2 developments have blurred the borders
between national labor markets and have allowed for the formation of international teams.
These developments have altered what teams of agents can do at a distance. Some tasks
such as data entry in consumer banking, software upgrades and maintenance, low-level cus-
tomer handling in call centers, or standardized manufacturing processes, are now frequently
done oﬀshore. Other, more knowledge intensive, tasks (such as data manipulation, software
development, higher-end sales and service, and R&D and product design in manufacturing
industries) continue to be undertaken domestically.3 Broadly, routine tasks are oﬀshored,
while more complex tasks are done domestically. Thus, the traditional vertical division of
labor within a team, whereby some low skill agents (workers) undertake routine tasks and
some high skill agents (managers) specialize in knowledge intensive tasks, can now take place
across countries.
In our view, what is important about this new division of labor is that it alters the
feasible matches between agents’ skill types. High skilled agents in more developed countries
can leverage their knowledge at lower cost by working with cheaper labor on routine tasks,
and the better workers in less developed countries are able to become part of international
high value added teams.
In this paper, we present a simple framework that puts agent skill heterogeneity and
matching at the center of the analysis. By allowing us to analyze changes in matching and
in the supporting earnings functions, our framework allows us to examine the impact of
oﬀshoring tasks on wages, on occupational choice (production versus knowledge jobs) and (as
matches are ‘many-to-one’) on the distribution of ﬁrm sizes.
We model an economy in which production requires physical inputs and knowledge, and
where a continuum of agents with heterogenous abilities sort into teams competitively. Agents
of diﬀerent skill levels form teams. Less skilled agents (‘workers’) specialize in production
work and deal with routine tasks; while more skilled agents specialize in knowledge intensive
tasks (‘managers’). Relative to less skilled managers, better managers are able to increase
the productivity of all the workers in their team, as they are able to solve a wider range of the
problems their team confronts in production. Better production workers allow individuals
to manage larger teams, as workers can solve more problems by themselves and require less
help. This results in a complementarity between manager and worker ability that determines
the identity of agents working and managing diﬀerent teams. It also determines, through
1Improvements in information technology have reduced the cost of international data and voice transfer
from prohibitively expensive to levels that are virtually identical to within country communication costs.
2Recent political and economic reforms in China, India and Eastern Europe have substantially liberalized
economic activity. Meanwhile, the world-wide deregulation and competition in the telecomunications industry
has contributed substantially to the drop in communication costs.
3For an unsystematic but useful data survey documenting these patterns see The Economist,N o v e m b e r
13, 2004. “A world of work: A survey of outsourcing.”
1comparative advantage, the occupational choice of agents. More able agents, although more
productive as production workers, want to set up their own ﬁrms and manage their own
teams of workers, instead of working for other managers. The distribution of skills in the
population then determines the types of teams that are formed and the wages that diﬀerent
agents command.
To study the impact of the formation of international teams in this economy, we study a
simple one-sector, two-country model in which countries diﬀer only in their skill distributions.
In particular, one country, the North, has a distribution of skills with a relatively high
mean, while the other country, the South, has a distribution of skills with a relatively low
mean. In our model, the ‘skill overlap’ implied by these skill diﬀerences is captured by a
single parameter, which plays a crucial role in the analysis. The other key parameter in our
model is the cost of communicating knowledge within teams (i.e., the state of communication
technology), which determines the extent to which managers can leverage their knowledge
via larger teams.
We initially study the case in which cross-country teams are prohibitively expensive, so
that the equilibria in the North and in the South correspond to those of two closed economies.
We then compare these equilibria to that of a perfectly integrated international economy,
where cross-border teams are as expensive as local ones. We refer to this type of integration
as ‘globalization.’
We ﬁrst show that globalization leads to the formation of international teams in which
Northern managers supervise teams of Southern workers: oﬀshoring. Oﬀshoring thus allows
for the geographic separation of production and problem solving, and the delocation of phys-
ical production towards the South. It leads to the creation of production jobs and an increase
in production in the South, and to the creation of knowledge intensive jobs and a decrease in
production in the North. This implies that the pattern of trade is such that the South is a
net exporter of manufacturing goods, while the North is a net exporter of knowledge services.
If international trade statistics do not appropriately record the managerial services inherent
in the ﬂow of knowledge within and across multinational ﬁrms, our model is consistent with
the emergence of trade imbalances between the North (e.g., the United States) and the South
(e.g., China).
Globalization also aﬀects the level and structure of earnings of individuals, both in the
North and in the South. We ﬁrst show that our model is consistent with the empirical
regularity that ‘Southern’ workers employed in multinational ﬁrms receive wages that are
on average higher than those received by workers employed in domestic ﬁrms (see Aitken
et al. (1996) for empirical evidence). We next analyze how globalization aﬀects income
inequality within each of the two countries. We show that globalization leads to an increase
in within-worker wage inequality in the South. This prediction is consistent with the ﬁndings
of several empirical studies (e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Anderton et. al. (2002), and
Marin (2004) among many others). These ﬁndings have received considerable attention in the
2international trade literature since they cannot be easily rationalized with standard factor
proportions trade frameworks. Our theory predicts an increase in within-worker inequality
in the South as a result of changes in matching: globalization improves the quality of the
managers with whom southern workers are matched, thus raising the productivity of these
workers, and thereby leading to an increase in their marginal return to skill. This eﬀect is
reinforced by an occupational choice eﬀect: more agents become workers, hence increasing
the range of abilities in the worker skill distribution.
The eﬀect on wage inequality in the North is more complicated. On the one hand, low-
skilled workers in the North face increased competition from Southern workers and this tends
to reduce their marginal return to skill. On the other hand, our model highlights a new
force leading to an increase in wage inequality in the North. When more low skilled agents
are available, the time of high skilled managers becomes more scarce, and workers who are
better able to economize on this time become relatively more valuable. As a result, the
value of more skilled workers relatively to less skilled ones increases, as does the diﬀerence
between the ability of the managers they are matched with. When either communication
costs or the skill overlap are suﬃciently low, so that high skill managers are particularly
valuable and scarce, this last eﬀect dominates and globalization increases wage inequality
not only in the South but also in the North. Conversely, when communication costs and the
skill overlap are suﬃciently large, the former eﬀect dominates and oﬀshoring is associated
with lower wage inequality in the North. This may help rationalize the ﬁndings of Feenstra
and Hanson (1996b, 1999) that oﬀshoring raised wage inequality in the United States in the
1980s but not in the 1970s. Our theory suggests that these ﬁndings can be explained by lower
communication costs and deeper trade integration with less developed countries in the 1980s
than in the 1970s.4
Which ﬁrms engage in oﬀshoring? We show that the answer depends on the two main
parameters in the model: the level of communication costs and the size of the skill overlap.
When the skill overlap is large and communication costs are high, only the most productive,
large ﬁrms will engage in oﬀshoring; while, when the skill overlap is small and communication
costs are low, the ﬁrms that engage in oﬀshoring will actually be the least productive ﬁrms,
those controlled by the lowest skilled managers. More generally, we show that the ‘quality’ of
oﬀshoring, as measured by the average skill level of the workers that form international teams
relative to the skill level of all Southern workers, is weakly increasing in both the skill overlap
and communication costs. At the same time, we show that the ‘quantity’ of oﬀshoring, as
measured by the proportion of Southern workers that work for Northern managers, is instead
weakly decreasing in both communication costs and the skill overlap, and converges to zero
as the skill distributions completely overlap. We also study how occupational choices, the
4The ability of our model to deliver the level of income for all agents in the economy also allows us to
identify the winners and losers from globalization. In particular, In Section 4.3 we show that there is always
a subset of workers that are hurt by globalization.
3size distribution of ﬁrms, and wage inequality are aﬀected by these same parameters.5
One of the advantages of our approach is that oﬀshoring is not only the result of the
relative aggregate supply of skills, but rather follows from the competitive sorting of agents
with diﬀerent skill levels into teams. Paraphrasing Sattinger (1993) wages in the economy
play an allocative role rather than simply being rewards for the possession of particular
characteristics. This allows us to derive conclusions on the characteristics of oﬀshoring ﬁrms
as well as on the distribution of wages. Most other eﬀorts to understand oﬀshoring do
not have this feature. Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1997 and 2003), for example, assume
factor endowments of skilled and unskilled workers in the North and South, and a production
function that uses these inputs either to produce intermediate or ﬁnal goods.6 In these models
oﬀshoring is the result of foreign direct investment and leads to changes in wage inequality as
a result of changes in the sectoral composition of production. Their work is important in that
it determines the changes in wages due to these sectoral (in inputs or output) compositional
changes.7 In general, however, it is silent about changes in wage inequality within narrowly-
deﬁned sectors as well as on the cross-sectional characteristics of oﬀshoring ﬁrms. Other
papers have developed frameworks with similar characteristics that also abstract from the
dimensions that we focus on, in particular Acemoglu (2003), Bernard et al. (2004), Zhu and
Treﬂer (2004) and Verhoogen (2004).
Our paper is closely related to the work of Grossman and Maggi (2000) and Kremer
and Maskin (2003), in that they also study the relationship between patterns of trade and
patterns of matching between the skills of diﬀerent workers.8 Grossman and Maggi (2000)
consider the consequences of diﬀerent types of production functions involving substitutability
or complementarity in skills for the patterns of specialization and trade. A maintained
assumption in their analysis is that international teams are not allowed to form. In this
respect, our work is more closely related to Kremer and Maskin (2003), who study the
patterns of trade and wages that result from production functions that are characterized by
complementarity between inputs and imperfect substitutability between them.9
Consistent with any production function that may hope to address within-worker wage
inequality, the production function we study involves skill complementarity, imperfect substi-
5For instance, we show that our model is consistent with an increase in the relative endowment of skilled
agents in the South leading to increased within-worker inequality in that country. This is consistent with the
ﬁndings of Zhu and Treﬂer (2004) and is not easily rationalizable with standard general equilibrium models.
6Feenstra and Hanson (1997) assume that the supply of skill and unskilled labor does respond to relative
wages, but they do not model the occupational choice decision or the sorting of agents into production teams.
7Feenstra and Hanson (2003) stress that these changes in the sectoral composition of production may
occur within industries and may therefore not be picked up by industry-level price indices (c.f., Lawrence and
Slaughter (1993)).
8Nocke and Yeaple (2004) present an assignment model of FDI, but focus on the matching between brands
of diﬀerent quality and entrepreneurs of heterogenous ability.
9Our paper is also related to a branch in the literature that has stressed the importance of heterogeneity in
understanding the diﬀerential impact that globalization may have on diﬀerent types of ﬁrms or workers (e.g.
Manesse and Turrini (2001), Melitz (2003), Helpman et al. (2004), Antràs and Helpman (2004), and Yeaple
(2004)).
4tutability between workers skill, and diﬀerential sensitivity to the skills of diﬀerent workers
(see Kremer and Maskin 1997). Our model is, however, diﬀerent in four key dimensions.
First, following Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg’s (2003, 2004), it is the only one to involve
hierarchical one-to-many matching (rather than one-to-one—matching), where a manager is
endogenously matched with a potentially large number of workers, and can potentially raise
the output of all of them. Second, the identity of managers and workers is endogenous and
is the result of an occupational choice decision. Third, the actual team production function
results naturally and endogenously from a production process which does not assume skill
complementarities, but rather derives them from the specialization of agents in diﬀerent as-
pects of the process — production and knowledge. Fourth, the relation between the skill of
the manager and that of the worker is mediated by communication technology — that is, the
state of communication technology determines the extent to which a manager can leverage
his knowledge by communicating it to many or few production workers. As a result of these
diﬀerences, we are able to move beyond previous contributions in formally analyzing how the
process of globalization interacts with the state of communication technologies in determining
the worldwide organization of production and the structure of rewards that support it.10
Our paper diﬀers from Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg’s (2003) in several key aspects.
Given our focus on oﬀshoring, we simplify the analysis in two directions to be able to analyze
the impact of matching across distributions. We take the skill level of agents as exogenous,
and we limit team sizes to two layers, while in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2003) knowledge
and the number of layers are endogenous. The payoﬀ for this simpliﬁcation is that we obtain
a number of new results. First, we are able to show that the equilibrium of the model
is unique. Second, we provide a closed-form solution to the model which permits a more
detailed characterization of the equilibrium. Third and most importantly, we are able to
study the relationship between matching and wage inequality across countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic framework for
a closed economy and shows existence, uniqueness, and optimality. Section 3 constructs an
equilibrium in the integrated economy and discusses its basic properties. Section 4 discusses
the eﬀects of economic integration or globalization. Section 5 presents comparative statics
with respect to communication costs and the skill overlap, and Section 6 concludes. All the
proofs in the paper are relegated to Appendices A and B.
2 The Model
Agents are endowed with one unit of time and a skill level z. The distribution of skills in
the population is given by a cumulative distribution function G(z), with density g (z), that
for the moment we will assume has support in [0, ¯ z] with ¯ z ≤ 1. Agents rank consumption
10For previous equilibrium models of the allocation of heterogeneous agents to hierarchical teams, but which
do not involve matching between workers and managers, see Lucas (1978), Rosen (1982), and Waldman (1984).
5according to a linear utility function, so they are income maximizers, given that we normalize
the price of the only good in the economy to one.
Our theory of the organization of production follows Garicano (2000). Production is
done by teams with one manager and production workers. While producing, workers face
problems that have to be solved. If a worker knows the solution to his problem, he solves it
and uses his time to produce one unit of output. If he does not know the solution, he can
ask his manager. If the manager knows the solution to the problem, the manager solves it
immediately, communicates the solution to the worker, and the worker then uses his time to
produce. The manager spends 0 <h<1 units of time communicating what he knows to the
worker no matter if he knows the solution to the problem or not. The skill level of an agent
determines the set of problems he can solve. An agent with skill z can solve all problems
that require knowledge between 0 and z. We normalize the set of problems so that the skill
level z is also the proportion of problems an agent can solve.11 Hence, a manager in a team
with n workers of skill zp faces the following time constraint
h(1 − zp)n =1 ,
and so can deal with n(zp)=1 /[h(1 − zp)] workers.12 P r o d u c t i o ni nat e a mf o r m e db ya
















Agents choose whether to become managers or workers so as to maximize their utility,
that is, their income. Hence given their ability z they solve
max{R(z),w(z)}.
11The upper bound ¯ z thus represents the fraction of problems that the most-skilled agent in the economy
can solve.
12In principle, the interpretation of our technology given in the text requires us to address the stochastic
element in the arrival of problems, which could result in congestion and queuing. Doing so would not, we
believe, add to the economics of the question at hand. An alternative interpretation, that circumvents the
need to address these issues, is that each worker draws a continuum of problems of measure one. Workers
then solve the problems that they can, given their skill level, and asks managers for help on the measure of
problems that they do not know how to solve. Then, h would be interpreted as the time cost for a manager
of helping on a measure one of problems.
6This implies that the earnings function, the envelope of the wage and rent function given
occupational choices, has to be continuous.
In equilibrium labor markets clear. Namely, at the equilibrium wages and earnings,
the supply and demand of production workers equalize at all skill levels. Let w(·) be an
equilibrium wage function, and let the equilibrium occupational choice decision be such that
agents with skill levels in [0,z∗] become workers and agents in [z∗, ¯ z] become managers.
Agents with knowledge z∗ are indiﬀerent. This restriction turns out to be without loss of
generality, as Theorem 1 below shows. Let m(z) b et h es k i l ll e v e lo ft h em a n a g e ro faw o r k e r
with ability z. We prove in Theorem 1 that an equilibrium allocation of this economy has
to satisfy positive sorting, and therefore that m is invertible. Then, labor market clearing









g(z)dz all zp ≤ z∗,
where m−1 (z) is the ability of the workers hired by a manager of ability z. The left-hand-side
of this equation is the supply of workers between 0 and zp. The right-hand-side is the demand
for workers by managers between m(0) = z∗ and m(zp). Market clearing is guaranteed when
supply equals demand for every skill level of workers zp <z ∗. Substituting for n and deriving
with respect to zp we obtain that, as long as z<z ∗ and m(z) is increasing (positive sorting),




Notice that in this economy positive sorting is always guaranteed because of the complemen-
tarity between workers’ and managers’ talent. Hence, better workers always work for better
managers, a property we will exploit intensively below. This diﬀerential equation, together
with the two boundary conditions m(0) = z∗ and m(z∗)=¯ z, determines the equilibrium
assignment function. Notice that the equilibrium assignment of workers to managers is inde-
pendent of wages and rents once positive sorting is imposed.13 The reason is that the span
of control of managers is a technological restriction of the problem. Managers add agents to
their teams until they do not have any time left. If agents could acquire skills, or could work
by themselves, this helpful property of our economy would be lost and the analysis would
be much more complicated. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2003) and (2004) present closed
economy frameworks that incorporate these dimensions.
A competitive equilibrium in our economy is therefore given by a wage function w,ar e n t
function R, an assignment function m, and occupational choice decisions (summarized by z∗),
such that managers maximize rents ((2) is satisﬁed and w0 (z∗) <R 0 (z∗))14, agents maximize
13Of course, equilibrium wages and rents sustain the assignment as an equilibrium allocation, but we do not
need to know them to compute the assignment function.
14The second condition is needed to guarantee that managers at ¯ z do not proﬁt from hiring agents with
abilities slightly above z
∗. The condition is necessary given that (2) only holds for z ∈ (0,z
∗) but not for z
∗.
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2003) show that this condition would always be satisﬁed if we were to allow
agents to produce individually as well as in teams.
7utility (w(z∗)=R(z∗)), and labor markets clear ((3) is satisﬁed together with m(0) = z∗
and m(z∗)=¯ z). The following theorem shows that an equilibrium of this economy exists as
long as h is lower than a threshold h∗. It also shows that if an equilibrium exists, it is unique,
eﬃcient, exhibits positive sorting, and can be characterized by a threshold z∗ as we have done
so far. On top of this, we can show in general that the earnings function max{R(z),w(z)}
is strictly convex.
Theorem 1 There exists a threshold h∗ > 0 such that if h ∈ [0,h ∗] there exists a unique
competitive equilibrium of this economy. In equilibrium the set of managers and the set of
workers are connected, the equilibrium exhibits positive sorting, and the earnings function is
strictly convex. Furthermore, the equilibrium allocation is eﬃcient.
In the rest of the paper we will analyze the case in which we specify the distribution
of abilities to be a piecewise uniform density. In this case we can show that h∗ > 0.85,
and so for the rest of the paper we will assume that communication costs are such that
h ∈ [0,0.85]. The reason that we need to restrict h for an equilibrium to exists, is that we are
not allowing agents to be self-employed. If we where to allow them to work on their own, we
could guarantee existence also for communication costs between 0.85 and 1 (see Garicano and
Rossi-Hansberg (2004)). However, this would come at the cost of a more complicated analysis
of the model, which we believe would obscure the main message of the paper. Finally, note
that we have assumed that a manager with ability zm hires workers of homogeneous ability
zp. In Appendix B, we generalize the technology and show that this assumption is without
loss of generality.
2.1 Equilibrium in the Closed Economy
Consider a world formed by two independent economies where agents can only form teams
with other agents in the same economy. The ﬁrst one, that we call the North, is exactly as
described before but with a uniform distribution of skills in the population, GN (z)=z for
z ∈ [0,1], with density gN (z)=1 . In the North, the best agents of the economy can therefore
solve all the problems that arise in production. The second economy, that we call the South,
also has a uniform distribution of skills, but the support of the distribution is the interval
[0,α] for α<1, with GS (z)=z/α for z ∈ [0,α], and density gS (z)=1 /α. The best agents
in the South can thus solve only a fraction α of the problems that they face while producing.
The North is, therefore, relatively better endowed with skilled agents, but both countries are
identical in all other respects, including population size. We will often refer to the parameter
α as the skill overlap. The uniform assumption for the distribution of skills in both countries
serves two purposes. First it implies that the skewness in the wage distribution implied by
our framework is the result of the economic forces we consider and not the distribution of
skills we assume. Second, it allows us to solve the whole model analytically.
8The northern economy is just a special case of the southern economy when α is equal to 1.
Hence, we start by describing an equilibrium in the South. All the expressions are identical
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1+h2 +2 h(1 − α)
h
. (5)
That is, all agents with skills between 0 and z∗
S become workers and all agents with skills
between z∗
S and α become managers. It is easy to show that z∗
S increases as communication
technology improves, that is, as h declines. An increase in z∗
S implies that more agents become
workers, which is the result of an increase in the span of control of managers. All managers
can have larger teams, so in equilibrium there are less managers and more workers.
In an economy with more skilled agents, larger α, z∗
S is higher. There are two forces that
determine this eﬀect. First, as α increases and therefore the density 1/α decreases, we are
reducing the mass of low skilled agents and increasing the mass of high skilled agents, which
implies that, given the size of teams, agents with higher skills decide to become workers.
Second, as we increase the skill level of the best workers in the economy, the best agents
manage larger teams which reduces the set of managers and increases the set of workers.
An economy with higher α or lower h is an economy in which the skill levels of the agents
that become workers is more dispersed. Given wages, this higher skill dispersion will lead
to higher measured wage inequality. We call this eﬀect the occupational choice eﬀect. Of
course, there is also an equilibrium response of wages that needs to be combined with this
eﬀect to obtain conclusions on the implications of changes in h and α on the distribution of
wages. We study these general equilibrium eﬀects below.
A characteristic of this equilibrium is that, bec a u s eo fp o s i t i v es o r t i n g ,m o r es k i l l e dm a n -
agers lead teams with more skilled workers. Since the size of a ﬁrm is uniquely determined
by the skill levels of its workers and by an economy-wide parameter h, higher skilled agents
work in larger ﬁrms. Because managers of these ﬁr m sh a v em o r es k i l l s ,t h e ys o l v eal a r g e r
proportion of the problems they face, and so these ﬁrms are more productive. The average
product of labor is thus higher in these teams. As we will now see, this will result in both
managers and workers in these teams earning more per unit of skill: The wage and rent
functions will be convex in the level of skills (see also Theorem 1 above).
We now turn to a formal analysis of the determination of earnings in this economy.
Equation (2), together with wS (z∗
S)=RS (z∗
S), implies that the equilibrium wage function is
given by
wS (z)=z∗
















The slope of the wage function, the marginal return to skill for workers, is thus given by
w0
S (z)=σS + hz.
Hence the wage function is convex: the marginal return to skill increases with the skill level.
This force is captured by the convexity term hz, and it reﬂects the imperfect substitutability
between workers of diﬀerent skills — the skill price per unit of skill varies with the skill level.
Throughout the paper, we refer to this force as the complementarity eﬀect. There is a second
determinant of the marginal return to skill, the one given by σS, which is determined by the
supply and demand of worker’ skills in equilibrium: the competition eﬀect.
The marginal return to skill can be shown to be an increasing function of h.T h a t i s ,
it decreases with an improvement in communication technology. There are two interacting
equilibrium eﬀects. As communication costs decrease, given the threshold z∗
S, team size
increases. Since the diﬀerence between the skill levels of the managers of two diﬀerent workers
will be smaller the larger are team sizes, complementarity between worker and manager skills
implies a decrease in the marginal return to skill: the complementarity eﬀect. The second
eﬀect is the result of the need for more worker skills which increases their baseline price:
the competition eﬀect. Overall, since teams sizes are larger, workers are matched with better
managers, which increases their returns to skill.
The marginal return to skill is also increasing in α,s i n c eσS is an increasing function of
z∗
S w h i c hi nt u r ni n c r e a s e sw i t hα. In this case the complementarity eﬀect is absent, and the
competition eﬀect implies that since agents are more skilled, there are too few workers per
manager at the old threshold, which requires raising workers’ return to skill in equilibrium.
Again, workers are matched with better managers and this increases the returns to their own
skills.
After solving for the distribution of wages, we turn next to the analysis of managerial





















Given that the assignment function is increasing (positive sorting), the rent function is convex:
The marginal return to skill for managers increases with their skill level (see Theorem 1
above). Note also that the marginal return to skill for managers is equal to the number of
10workers in their team. Hence, every time we derive conclusions about ﬁrm size the same
applies for the marginal return to skill of managers.
Aw o r k e ro fa b i l i t yz works for a manager with ability m(z). This means that the total










S (6 + 3h − hz∗
S). (8)
It is easy to verify that YS decreases with h and increases with α. The reasoning is simple:
the larger is h, the higher are communication costs, the less can managers leverage their
knowledge, and the lower is the implied average productivity. As α increases, the average
skill level in the economy increases, which also leads to larger output.
3 E q u i l i b r i u mi nt h eW o r l dE c o n o m y
Consider a world economy formed by the two countries described above, North and South.
In the world equilibrium, agents can form production teams with agents in their own country
or with agents in the other country. We assume that the cost of communicating the solution
to a problem, h, is the same whether communication happens between agents in the same
or in diﬀerent countries. We could add an extra cost of communicating with agents in
another country. However, this extra cost would then inﬂuence the formation of international
teams directly and would open a wedge between wages in diﬀerent countries, thereby greatly
complicating the analysis of the economic forces in the equilibrium of our setup. Furthermore,
this added complexity would be associated with relatively small gains in terms of new results
or economic insights, unless we allowed for multiple layers of management within a ﬁrm. We
leave these potentially interesting extensions for future research.
The equilibrium in the world economy is very similar to an equilibrium in the individual
countries once we adjust the distribution of talent in the population. The distribution of
skills in the world population is given by the sum of the distribution of skills in the South




α z if 0 <z<α
z if α<z<1
.
The construction of an equilibrium in this economy parallels the one for a closed economy
with one caveat. Since the density of skills in the world is not continuous, the derivative of the
assignment function is not continuous. However, an equilibrium allocation must be such that
the earnings function is continuous and diﬀerentiable for all z except at the threshold that
divides workers and managers, at which it is not diﬀerentiable, just as in the closed economy.
15Equivalently, output may be calculated as the integral over managerial skill of the production function,
n(m
−1(z))z. Both expressions yield the same result, as one results from a change of the variable of integration
in the other.
11If this condition is not satisﬁed, some managers and workers would have incentives to form
new teams. This characteristic of an equilibrium allocation implies that the assignment
function is continuous. Hence, Theorem 1 applies for the world economy as well.
Depending on the value of h and α, we can show that there are two types of equilibria in
the world. The ﬁrst one is an equilibrium in which all agents in the South are workers. Since
there are no managers in the South, all of them work for northern managers. That is, they
all work in international teams. Positive sorting implies that, because they are the lowest
quality workers in the world (there is an identical set of workers in the North plus some more
skilled ones), they work for the worst managers in the North. Hence, international teams are
associated with the worst managers in the world. We call this the Low Quality Oﬀshoring
Equilibrium (LQE).
The second type of equilibrium is one in which some of the agents in the South are
managers. This equilibrium features the less skilled workers in the South working for southern
managers, and the more skilled ones working for the best managers in the North. We call
this the High Quality Oﬀshoring Equilibrium (HQE). All our results are derived under the
assumption that international teams are formed only if managers strictly prefer to hire foreign



















Figure 1: Types of Equilibria
The type of equilibrium in the world depends on the values of h and α.G i v e nα,al o w
communication cost h implies that teams are large and so the set of agents that choose to
become managers in the world is small. Since the top managers are always in the North, by
positive sorting, all agents in the South are wor k e r s .T h u s ,w ew i l lb ei naL Q E .C o n v e r s e l y ,a
16We are eﬀectively selecting the equilibrium with the least amount of oﬀshoring. This is analogous to the
approach in Helpman (1984).
12high communication cost h implies that teams will be small, the set of managers will be large,
so some agents in the South will be managers, and we will be in a HQE. Given h,i fα is small
all agents in the South will have relatively low skills, and so they will be workers: A LQE.
If α is large, some agents in the South have relatively high ability, and some of them will
be managers: A HQE. In general, the set of parameter values that determines the boundary
between these two equilibria is a non-linear function of h and α that we will determine below,
and which we plot in Figure 1. We analyze each equilibrium in turn.
3.1 Low Quality Oﬀshoring Equilibrium
Denote by z∗
WLthe threshold that separates the ability of the agents that choose to be workers
or managers in a LQE. In order for the world equilibrium to be a LQE it must be the case
that α<z ∗
WL (i.e., that all agents in the South are workers). For an assignment to satisfy




α h(1 − z) if 0 <z<α
h(1 − z) if α<z<z ∗
WL
.
Equilibrium in the labor market also implies that m(0) = z∗
WL and m(z∗
WL)=1 . In order for
the wage function to be diﬀerentiable (see (2)), the assignment function has to be continuous
at all z<z ∗
WL, and in particular at α. This characteristic of the equilibrium allocation
provides another boundary condition of the problem. Using the two diﬀerential equations






























1+h2 (3 − α)
h
. (10)
Again, simple diﬀerentiation veriﬁes that z∗
WL, the set of workers in the world, decreases with
h and increases with α, where the intuition is similar to the one for the closed economy. Note
that the assignment function is continuous, but not diﬀerentiable, at α.




2+α − α2.( 1 1 )
The right-hand-side of the inequality is decreasing in α and is equal to zero for α =1and
equal to one for α =0 . This condition, with equality, is the curve that separates the parameter
set where we obtain each equilibrium and that was plotted in Figure 1.
Maximization of rents by managers implies that wages have to satisfy (2). Furthermore,
13in order for agents not to have incentives to join other ﬁrms in the economy, that would
be willing to hire them, we also know that the earnings function has to be continuous. In
particular, the wage function has to be continuous at α and wages and rents have to be equal
at z∗
WL. The latter condition is given by wWL(z∗
WL)=RWL(z∗
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σ2L = σ1L + h.















for h<h ∗ (see the proof of Theorem 1). Hence, the earnings function has a kink, a non-
diﬀerentiability, at z∗
WL. This implies that, given that the wage and rent functions are convex,
the marginal return to skill is larger for managers than for workers.
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of northern workers 
in [α,z*WL]
Figure 2: Low Quality Oﬀshoring Equilibrium
Figure 2 summarizes what we have discussed about a LQE. Agents with skills in [0,α] in
the South and North work for northern managers with skills in [z∗
WL,m WL(α)].A g e n t si n
14the North with skills in [α,z∗
WL] work for managers in the North with skills in [mWL(α),1].
The wage function of all workers in the world, and the rent function of northern managers,
is a continuous and diﬀerentiable function of skills. The marginal return to skill of managers
is larger than that of workers.
It is easy to draw an initial conclusion on the eﬀect of globalization (moving from autarky
to a world with international oﬀshoring). If the skill level of agents in the South is low and
communication costs are also relatively low we will be in a LQE. After globalization, some
agents switch occupation and become workers in the South and managers in the North. These
occupational choice implications of globalization will have multiple consequences for wages,
rents, output, consumption, as well as the cross-sectional diﬀerences between national and
international teams. We will study those in Section 4 in detail. First we turn to the analysis
of the second type of world equilibria: the HQE.
3.2 High Quality Oﬀshoring Equilibrium
A HQE is such that the highest skilled agents in the South decide to become managers. If
we denote by z∗
WH the threshold such that agents with lower skill decide to become workers
and agents with higher skill decide to become managers, in a HQE it must be the case that
z∗
WH <α . Positive sorting implies that, since the managers in the South are part of the group
of the lowest skilled managers in the world, they are matched with the lowest skilled agents.
In particular, agents in the set [0,z α]. Agents with skill lower than zα work for managers in
their own country (since we focus on the equilibrium with the least amount of oﬀshoring), and
workers with skill greater than zα work in international teams. The threshold zα is deﬁned
by the worker type that works for the best agent in the South, namely, m(zα)=α. Then,




h(1 − z) if 0 <z<z α
1+α
α h(1 − z) if zα <z<z ∗
WH
,
which restates condition (3) for this case, together with the same boundary conditions as
in the LQE: m(0) = z∗
WH and m(z∗
WH)=1 . On top of this we have to guarantee again
that the equilibrium assignment function is continuous, in particular at zα,i no r d e rf o rt h e
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.( 1 5 )
15One can verify again that z∗
WH is decreasing in h and increasing in α.U s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition









.( 1 6 )
It is straightforward to show that the condition that ensures that this world equilibrium is a
HQE (i.e., z∗
W <α ) is the reciprocal of condition (11).
Again, maximization of rents implies that condition (2) has to be satisﬁed, together
with wWH(z∗
WH)=RWH(z∗
WH) and continuity of wages at zα. Solving the two diﬀerential
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As in the LQE, it is easy to show that the marginal return to skill is increasing in the level
of skills and is larger for managers than for workers.
() α α
1 − = WH m z
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in northern firms 
and southern 
workers in southern 
firms
Northern workers in 
northern firms and 
southern workers in 
international firms
Northern managers of northern 
workers and southern managers 
of southern workers in [0,zα]
Northern managers of 
northern and southern 
workers in [zα,z*WH]
Figure 3: High Quality Oﬀshoring Equilibrium
16Let us summarize what we have shown for the HQE using Figure 3. Agents with skills
in [0,z α] work in national ﬁrms for managers with skills in [z∗
WH,α]. Agents with skills be-
tween zα = m−1 (α) and z∗
WH work for northern managers with skills in [α,1]. This set of
managers includes the ones that manage international teams. As before, the earnings func-
tion is continuous and diﬀerentiable everywhere except for z∗
WH in which its slope increases
discreetly.
4E ﬀects of Globalization
We study here the impact of an exogenous policy or technological change, that we call glob-
alization, and that allows for the formation of international teams. We analyze its eﬀects on
the composition of teams, occupational choices, and the rewards structure of the economy.
To do so, we compare the world equilibrium of Section 3 with the autarkic equilibria in the
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Figure 4a: Matching before
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Figure 4b: Matching before
and after globalization in a HQE
4.1 Matching, Occupational Choice and Firm Characteristics
How does globalization aﬀect occupational choices? To compare the open and autarkic equi-
libria we use Figure 4. The ﬁgure presents the matching functions in autarky and the two
type of world equilibria. The blending of the two skill distributions produces a rearrangement
of the matches for both northern and southern workers. Independently of the equilibrium we
17are studying, it is evident from the ﬁgure that all the workers in the South strictly improve
their match, that is, the presence of better managers in the international market improves
their matches. This is the case even for southern workers that do not match with interna-
tional managers, since some southern managers become workers in international teams, and
the absence of these managers increases the quality of the match of every worker. Agents
who were managers before globalization may either become workers (as there is a supply of
higher quality managers that can do better their problem solving job) or they may remain
managers. In the latter case, they are matched with lower skilled workers, precisely because
some of the southern managers who were previously managing low quality workers have be-
come workers, and the remaining managers are left to hire lower quality agents. In other
words, while workers always beneﬁt from the higher quality managers available for matching,
managers’ matches suﬀer from the increasing competition of better international managers.
The picture is considerably diﬀerent for workers in the North. The key change is in the op-
portunities of the middle-skilled agents in the North. Previously, they were not ‘good enough’
to be team managers. After globalization, their opportunities have greatly expanded, since
there is a set of low-skilled agents who need managing. As a result, some of these marginal
workers become managers of low skilled agents. This implies that matches of northern agents
with suﬃciently low skill necessarily become worse. However, the highly skilled workers in
the North have now less competition, since some of their highly skilled competitors, particu-
larly the ones who were previously matched with the best northern managers, have become
managers. Hence, as we show formally in Proposition 1 and illustrate in Figure 4, there
is a skill level ζ below which workers have worse matches, while above it northern workers
improve their matches. The following proposition formalizes these results.17
Proposition 1 Globalization has the following eﬀects on team formation:





(ii) (a) Southern workers that were already workers are matched with a better manager;
(b) Southern managers that remain managers are matched with worse workers;
(c) Southern managers that become workers are matched with a northern manager;
(iii) (a) There exists a unique threshold ζ such that all northern workers that remain work-
ers with z<ζare matched with a worse manager, while those with z>ζare
matched with a better manager;
(b) All northern managers that were already managers with z<m W(ζ) are matched
with a better worker, while those with z>m W(ζ) are matched with a worse worker.
17When the distinction between LQE and HQE is not relevant we denote variables in the world economy
with a subscript W. We follow this notation for all variables and functions.
18Part (i) of Proposition 1 has implications for the eﬀects of globalization on job cre-
ation/destruction and ﬁrm creation/destruction in each of the two countries. In particular, if
we associate the number of production jobs with the measure of production workers, a corol-
lary of the proposition is that globalization leads to production job creation in the South and
to production job destruction in the North. Similarly, if ﬁrms are identiﬁed by the managers
than run them, we can conclude that globalization leads to ﬁrm destruction in the South and
to ﬁrm creation in the North.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1 also have implications for the size distribution of ﬁrms
in each country. Since the best workers in the North are now matched with a better manager,
t h es i z eo ft h el a r g e s tﬁrms in the North decreases. However, the size of the smallest ﬁrms
increases since those managers are matched with better workers. Hence, the range of ﬁrm sizes
in the North decreases. In contrast, all businesses that remain alive in the South shrink, since
all southern managers are matched with worst workers. Therefore, size dispersion in the South
also decreases. Summarizing, measured from the southern perspective, globalization leads to
ﬁrm destruction and to downsizing of the surviving businesses. At the end of this section we
will show that this structural change, which at ﬁrst glance may seem to be damaging for the
South, actually results in welfare gains for both countries.
Corollary 1 Globalization leads to production job creation and ﬁrm destruction in the South,
and to production job destruction and ﬁrm creation in the North. Furthermore, it compresses
the size distribution of ﬁrms in both countries and reduces the size of all surviving southern
ﬁrms.
Proposition 1 also implies that the best workers in the South are in international teams
and thus work for the most productive and larger ﬁrms doing business in the South. This is
also evident in Figure 4: international matches (those that obtain for southern workers with
managers of quality higher than α) always involve the higher skilled among the southern
workers. This sorting may provide a rationale for the often-found evidence that ‘southern’
workers employed in multinational ﬁrms receive wages that are on average higher than those
received by workers employed in domestic ﬁrms (see, for instance, Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey
(1996) and Lipsey and Sjoholm (2004)). More speciﬁcally, a rationale for the regression result
is simply that those that hold oﬀshored jobs are unobservably more skilled than those that
do not, and so they are matched with better agents. Controlling linearly for the skill of
workers is unlikely to solve this problem, as earnings are the result, as we showed above, of
the interaction between the skill of the worker and that of the (higher quality) international
manager. In particular, Aitken et. al. (1996) only distinguish between skilled and unskilled
workers and Lipsey and Sjoholm (2004) control linearly for educational attainment of workers.
None of these controls eliminates the relationship between wages and multinationals generated
by our framework. In sum:
Corollary 2 The best workers in the South work for northern managers and receive higher
19wages than southern workers that are employed by southern managers.
4.2 Wage Inequality and Returns to Skill
The previous subsection focused on the implications on quantities of our theory. Corre-
sponding to those quantities, there are equilibrium eﬀects of globalization on prices. That is,
workers wages and managerial earnings must be such that the matches are rearranged in the
way we have described. In particular, recall that equilibrium requires that earnings of the
marginal worker be equal to those of the marginal manager; and that the slope of wages is
such that managers do not want to change the workers they hire.
We ﬁrst need to propose a set of measures that will help us characterize the eﬀect of
globalization on the distribution of wages, and in particular wage inequality. One potential
measure of wage inequality is the ratio of the wage of the highest skilled agent and the wage
of the lowest skilled agent. That is, w(z∗
W)/w(0), when we are referring to wage inequality
in the world. The problem with this measure is that it combines the level and slope eﬀects
on the wage distribution in a way that is not always straightforward to disentangle. In
particular, important level eﬀects may imply reductions in inequality in cases where the
slope of the wage function is strictly increasing. To avoid this problem we focus on changes
in the absolute diﬀerences between the wages of the highest skilled workers and the lowest
ones. That is, for the particular case illustrated before, wW (z∗
W) − wW (0). We will use this
measure consistently every time we talk about wage inequality.
An alternative measure of changes in wage inequality in the context of our model is
the change in the non-linear (quadratic) term in the wage equation. This term, which we
refer to as the complementarity eﬀect, measures the premium that a worker receives for
possessing a particular skill level, in excess of what several separate workers would receive for
possessing the same aggregate amount of skill. In other words, the term reﬂects the extent to
which workers with diﬀerent skill levels are imperfect substitutes in production, which is one
fundamental measure of the extent to which they are unequal in production. This narrower
measure may be more appealing from the perspective of recent empirical research in labor
economics, which controls for changes in inequality driven by simple increases in the price of
a unit of skill. Whatever measure of inequality is used, an increase in the complementarity
eﬀect will always unambiguously push the wage schedule towards higher inequality.
The model allows us to study the changes in the return to skill driven by the changes
in matching that globalization brings about. The analysis follows quite directly from the
changes in matching. First, inequality within southern workers unambiguously increases.
The marginal value of workers’ skill is driven by the skill of the manager with whom they are
matched, which increases for all southern workers. Thus, the sum of the complementarity and
the competition eﬀects unambiguously leads to higher returns to skill in this case. Moreover,
measured within worker inequality will increase even more, since the mass of workers in the
South unambiguously increases (occupational choice eﬀect).
20Proposition 2 Globalization increases within-worker wage inequality in the South. Further-
more, it increases the marginal return to skill for southern workers at all skill levels.
In the discussion above, the three eﬀects that determine southern wage inequality go in
the same direction. In general, however, the complementarity eﬀect depends on the speciﬁca-
tion of the distributions of ability in both countries. Hence, a natural question is how robust
is the direction of this eﬀect to other assumptions on the distribution of ability. For general
distributions of abilities, one can show that the complementarity eﬀect increases with glob-
alization as long as: 1) the distribution of abilities in the South is ﬁrst order stochastically
dominated by the distribution of abilities in the world (once the mass in both is normalized to
one); 2) both densities are nonincreasing in ability; and 3) the range of abilities in the South
is a subset of weakly smaller abilities than the range of abilities in the North. Under these
conditions one can show that z∗
S <z ∗
W <z ∗
N, which is implied by ﬁrst order stochastic dom-
inance and the labor market equilibrium condition. Given this, under the stated conditions,
m0
S (z) <m 0










W (z), all z ∈ [0,z∗
S].
Note that these conditions are only suﬃcient not necessary, and that they guarantee that
the complementarity eﬀect increases with integration for all ability levels in the South. If
any of these assumptions on the distributions does not hold, it may be the case that the
complementarity eﬀect decreases with integration in the South. To illustrate this consider
the case where the distributions in the North and South are both uniform, but the range
of abilities in the South is given by [0,1] a n di nt h eN o r t hb y[β,1] (so condition 3 is not











That is, integration leads to a decrease in the complementarity eﬀect. Clearly, the particular
assumptions we have imposed in this paper guarantee the three conditions above, and so
integration leads to an increase in the complementarity eﬀect for all α and h.
Consider next the eﬀects of globalization on northern wage inequality. Globalization
decreases the quality of the match of those northern workers who are relatively unskilled and
increases it for the more skilled among them. As we could expect, given that the marginal
return to skill of all workers is a function of the quality of the match, the returns to skill for
relatively low skilled northern workers go down, and the returns to skill for the more skilled
21ones go up. The change in the marginal return to skill can be written as
σ1W − σN + h
αz if 0 <z p <αand h<2(1− α)/
¡
2+α − α2¢
σ1W − σN + h if α<z p <z ∗
WL and h<2(1− α)/
¡
2+α − α2¢
σ1W − σN if 0 <z p <z α and h>2(1− α)/
¡
2+α − α2¢
σ1W − σN + h
α (z − zα) if zα <z p <z ∗




The equilibrium eﬀect on the marginal return to skill can again be decomposed in two. First,
because now there is more competition from workers in the South, the baseline return per
unit of skill always goes down. The competition eﬀect thus lowers the marginal return to
skill. Figure 5 plots σ1W − σN conﬁrming numerically that in fact the term is negative for










Figure 5: Change in average return
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Figure 6: Change in northern wage
inequality with (dashed) and without
(solid) occupational choice eﬀect.
Second, since there are relatively more workers with low skills in the world than in the
North, an increase in the skill level of workers increases the quality of their managers more
after globalization. Thus the complementarity eﬀect, captured by the convexity term in the
marginal returns equation (i.e. the term of the form constant × z), tends to increase the
marginal return to skill. The latter eﬀect is more valuable the higher the ability of the workers,
since they are part of larger teams, as long as southern and northern workers compete for the
same manager. In fact, for workers without skills, z =0 ,t h i se ﬀect is not present so the ﬁrst
eﬀect has to dominate and the marginal return to skill decreases. Numerically, we can show
that the second eﬀect dominates for high skilled workers and so the marginal return to skill
22increases for them.18 The threshold of ability at which both eﬀects are identical is a function
of the parameters h and α.T h el o w e rα the more southern agents are being added at each
skill level where workers in both countries compete, and so the larger the set of abilities in
which the complementarity eﬀect dominates. The lower h, the smaller the competition eﬀect,
and so again the threshold of abilities decreases.
In order to understand the eﬀects on wage inequality, we need to combine this reasoning
with the occupational choice eﬀect. In particular the fact that after globalization less agents
in the North become managers, which reduces wage disparity. Numerically we can conclude
that wage inequality in the North increases when h and α are small. Figure 6 illustrates
this claim with and without the occupational choice eﬀect. The ﬁgure plots the points for
which the change in wage inequality after globalization is zero. Wage inequality in the North
increases for all parameter combinations to the left of these curves. Notice how for wage
inequality in the North to increase, the main requirement is for communication costs to be
suﬃciently low. As mentioned in the introduction, this prediction is consistent with the
ﬁndings of Feenstra and Hanson (1996b, 1999), who reported a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of
oﬀshoring on U.S. wage inequality in the 1980s but not in the 1970s. We summarize these
results below.
Summary 1 Globalization increases within-worker wage inequality in the North if h and α
aresuﬃciently low, but it decreases it if h and α are suﬃciently high. Furthermore, globaliza-
tion decreases the marginal return to skill of all northern workers with knowledge z below a
threshold but increases the marginal return to skill of all northern workers above this threshold.
Our model also allows us to derive some conclusions on wage inequality among managers
in both countries. In particular, remember that the marginal return to skills of managers is
given by the size of their team. From Proposition 1 we know that all managers in the South
will have smaller teams and so the marginal return to skills for them decreases. Since there
are also fewer of them, within-manager income inequality in the South decreases. Again,
for the North the analysis is more complicated. First, from Proposition 1 we know that
t h el o w e s ts k i l l e dm a n a g e r s ,t h a tw e r ei nm a n a g e r i al positions before globalization, will have
larger teams, but the best managers will have smaller teams. This implies that the return
to skills of low ability managers increases and of high ability managers decreases. Second,
there are more managers in the North, so the occupational choice eﬀect leads to more income
inequality among managers. This reasoning leads to the following corollary of Proposition 1.
Corollary 3 Globalization has the following eﬀects on within-manager income inequality and
on the marginal return to skill of managers:
(i) Globalization decreases within-manager income inequality and the marginal return to
skill of southern managers;
18In our two parameter model it is straightforward to analyze numerically diﬀerent equilibrium values for a
tight grid of the whole parameter space.
23(ii) Globalization increases the marginal return to skill for northern managers with knowl-
edge z below a threshold but decreases it for the rest.
4.3 Winners and Losers
As the previous sections have shown, globalization leads to an improvement in the matches
of all southern workers, thus raising the marginal product of all of them. At the same time, it
increases the competition among low skilled agents, since low skilled southern workers must
now compete with northern workers for good matches. Which eﬀect dominates the balance
depends on communication costs and on the skill overlap between the two countries. If the
South is relatively very unskilled (α is low) the gain from the new available matches is very
high and the competition eﬀect is dominated by the improvement in matching. Moreover,
if h is low, all agents are matched with the top agents available in the distribution, and
thus opening the borders raises substantially the quality of the match. In fact, we can show
numerically that for low enough h and α, the gain in the quality of the match is suﬃciently
high that all southern workers with skills z =0are better oﬀ. Conversely, if h and α are
suﬃciently high southern workers are worse oﬀ.T h e c h a n g e i n w(0) is shown in Figure 7,
where the areas to the left of the curve are the parameter combinations where the change is
positive. In the previous section we showed that the marginal return to skill in the South
increases for all workers, hence for h and α low an increase in w(0) in the South implies that
all workers (that were workers before globalization) are better oﬀ.
Northern workers suﬀer a direct damage from the increasing competition from the South;
this is the standard market eﬀect that would appear in any general equilibrium model, even
without matching. However, as we saw in the previous subsection, the fact that the de-
mand for northern managers increases with globalization means that some workers become
managers and this raises the wage schedule for workers around them, who are matched with
better managers. Thus, indirectly (through the drop in the number of northern production
workers and the increase in managers) globalization increases the value of northern workers
and may actually help them. What ultimately determines the balance of these two eﬀects
is, as before, the skill overlap and the costs of communication. If the country with which
the oﬀshoring is undertaken is highly skilled (high α)t h i se ﬀectively limits the competitive
eﬀect. If communication costs are also high some of the southern agents will be managers
thereby decreasing further the competition eﬀect. Thus for high h and α, low skilled northern
workers are better oﬀ after globalization. The change in the wage of northern workers with
no skills, w(0), is shown in Figure 8 where the areas to the right of the dark line represent
parameter combinations where the change is positive. Notice that Figure 7 and 8 combined
imply that there are always losers from globalization, as illustrated in Figure 8 with the light
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Summary 2 Globalization has the following eﬀects on wages:
(i) Increases the wages of low skilled southern workers for low h and α,b u td e c r e a s e st h e m
for high h and α;
(ii) Decreases the wages of low skilled northern workers for low h and α,b u ti n c r e a s e st h e m
for high h and α;
(iii) It decreases the wage of at least some low skilled agents.
4.4 Production, Consumption, and Trade
As argued above, Theorem 1 applies also to the equilibrium of the world economy, and
therefore this equilibrium is unique and eﬃcient. As a result, since in the world economy we
could always replicate the equilibrium in the closed economies of the North and the South,
we know that in our framework there are always welfare gains from international oﬀshoring.
The following corollary summarizes this conclusion.
Corollary 4 Globalization increases total production in the world economy. That is, there
are gains from trade.
How are these gains distributed between the countries? We want to derive conclusions on
the eﬀect of globalization on manufacturing production and consumption in both countries
and, as an implication, on the balance of trade in goods. We deﬁne a country’s manufacturing
output as the quantity of goods that are produced by its workers, since they are the ones
that combine labor and knowledge to produce. Production in the South and North in the







































From these deﬁnitions, we know that in a HQE, the South’s share of production is always
1/(1 + α) a n dt h eN o r t hs h a r eα/(1 + α), since in this equilibrium the sets of workers overlap
perfectly.
In Proposition 1 (part (i)) we concluded that the number of workers increases in the
South and falls in the North with globalization. Other things equal, this will in turn increase
manufacturing production in the South and decrease it in the North. Other forces, however,
come into play as well. In particular the other two parts of Proposition 1. Southern workers
are matched with a better manager after globalization and so each of them produces more.
Low skilled northern workers are matched with worse managers and produce less, while high
skilled northern workers are matched with better managers. The implication for northern
manufacturing production resulting from this eﬀect is, thus, ambiguous. Overall, it is clear
that manufacturing output will increase in the South, and it is also easy to show numerically
that, for all combinations of h and α, manufacturing production actually decreases in the
North (see Figure 9). Hence, in terms of manufacturing value added, the winners of global-
ization are the southern countries. This conclusion refers, of course, only to manufacturing














Figure 9: Change in northern manu-
facturing output after globalization






















CWN = YW − CWS.
The reason why the North produces less after globalization is that manufacturing production
does not take into account that managers’ rents have to be repatriated. Managers consume
in their own country and they receive — as compensation for the time spent helping and
communicating with workers abroad — part of the production of these workers. These rents
can be substantial and in fact imply that once we take them into account consumption in
both countries increases. This can be shown numerically, for all values of h and α,a sF i g u r e s































Figure 11: Change in northern
consumption after globalization
Figures 10 and 11 show that both countries are better oﬀ in terms of total consump-
tion and, since utility is linear, in terms of welfare. In general, as countries globalize their
economies, northern countries will be disappointed in terms of manufacturing output, but
pleased in terms of consumption. Southern countries will gain under both criteria, but their
consumption increase will be smaller than what their manufacturing output statistics may
suggest. This diﬀerence in consumption and production outcomes has to be reﬂected in the
trade balance of these countries. In particular, the South features net exports of manufac-
turing goods, while the North features net exports of knowledge services.19 Furthermore, if
knowledge transactions are not registered as imports for the South and exports for the North,
the trade balance of the northern country will be in deﬁcit and that of the southern country
19Indeed, with the expressions above and using mW (z) >w(z), it is straigtforward to show that YWS −
CWS > 0, which of course implies YWN − CWN < 0.
27in surplus. This deﬁcit or surplus is, however, not evidence of an imbalance, but just the
result of the miss-recording of knowledge transactions. This reasoning suggests that some of
t h e s ef o r c e sm a yb ea tp l a yw h e nw el o o ka tt h et r a d eb a l a n c eo ft h eU Sw i t hs o m eo fi t s
Asian trade partners, like China. We summarize these conclusions below.
Summary 3 Globalization has the following eﬀects on manufacturing production, consump-
tion, and the trade balance:
(i) It increases manufacturing production in the South and decreases manufacturing pro-
d u c t i o ni nt h eN o r t h ;
(ii) It increases consumption (and thus welfare) in both countries;
(iii) The pattern of trade is such that the South exports manufactures and the North exports
knowledge services;
(iv) If knowledge transactions are not reported, globalization generates a trade surplus in the
S o u t ha n dat r a d ed e ﬁcit in the North.
5 Comparative Statics in the World Economy
In this section we analyze the eﬀect of changes in communication costs (h)a n dt h es k i l l
overlap (α) on the equilibrium outcome of the integrated economy. We ﬁrst study the impact
of these changes on the occupational choice decision and on the implied measures of workers
and managers in each of the two countries. We next analyze the eﬀects on the matching
between managers and workers, which in turn determine the impact on the characteristics
(quantity and quality) of international oﬀshoring, as well as the impact on the size distribution
and productivity of ﬁrms. Finally, we study the implications for the structure of earnings
in the world economy. In this latter respect, we show that the eﬀect of changes in both
parameters on wage inequality and the return to skill can again be decomposed into the
three eﬀects we have discussed so far.
5.1 Communication Costs
5.1.1 Occupational Choice
As h decreases managers can deal with larger teams. This implies that ﬁrms will be larger
in equilibrium, and therefore, for a given set of managers, the demand for workers increases.
This will lead to higher wages for the best workers and will incentivate the worst managers
to become workers. Since managers can leverage their knowledge more, given the lower
communication costs, only the most able agents in the world become managers. In a LQE all
agents in the South are workers and the decrease in communication costs implies that all of
them will remain workers. In contrast, in the North, as the set of workers increases, the set
of managers decreases. In a HQE the decrease in h implies that the set of workers in both
28countries increases and the set of managers decreases, even if the decline in communication
costs implies that we move from a HQE to a LQE. We formalize this result in the next
proposition.
Proposition 3 T h es k i l lo ft h ew o r l d ’ sm o s t - s k i l l e dw o r k e r( z∗
W)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nc o m m u -
nication costs (h). Hence, the number of workers in the South weakly decreases with h and
the number of workers in the North decreases with h. The number of managers in the South
weakly increases with h and the number of managers in the North increases with h.
From the previous proposition we can conclude that as communication costs in the world
decrease, we will see ﬁrm destruction in the North and, if communication costs and the skill
level in the South are high, we will see it in the South as well. In contrast, an improvement
in communication technology will lead to production job creation in the North and, if h and
α are large, to production job creation in the South as well.
5.1.2 The Quantity and Quality of Oﬀshoring
To analyze the quantity of oﬀs h o r i n gw en e e dam e a s u r et h a tc a p t u r e st h ee x t e n tt ow h i c h
ﬁrms in the economy are formed by national versus international teams. Therefore, we deﬁne
the quantity of oﬀshoring as the proportion of southern workers that work for international
teams. In a LQE, all agents in the South are workers in international teams, so it follows that











The proportion of workers in international teams is always less than one in a HQE, but
converges to one as we change parameters to approach the boundary between both type of
equilibria. Hence, in a LQE there is always more oﬀs h o r i n gt h a ni naH Q E .
In our framework it is also interesting to deﬁne what we call the quality of oﬀshoring. This
will help us analyze the characteristics of the ﬁrms that engage in oﬀshoring. We measure the
quality of oﬀshoring as the average skill level of the workers that form international teams
relative to the skill level of all southern workers. Again, in a LQE the quality of oﬀshoring is







Hence, in a HQE the quality of oﬀshoring is always larger than one and again converges to
1 as we change parameter values in a way that approaches the boundary between equilibria.
It thus follows that in a LQE the quality of oﬀs h o r i n gi sa l w a y sl o w e rt h a ni naH Q E ,
thus justifying the names that we chose for the two types of world equilibria in our setup.
29Understanding the quality of oﬀshoring is informative about the cross-sectional characteristics
of the ﬁrms that engage in oﬀshoring. In a HQE the ﬁrms that engage in oﬀshoring are on
average larger than national ﬁrms and, therefore, are on average more productive in terms
of output per capita. These ﬁrms will also pay on average higher wages than national ﬁrms
both in absolute terms and in units of skills. In contrast, in a LQE the ﬁrms that engage in
oﬀshoring are, on average, smaller, less productive, and pay lower absolute and per unit of
skill wages.
An improvement in communication technology implies that the quantity of oﬀshoring
increases. To see this, note that from the previous proposition z∗
W decreases with h,w h i c h
increases the quantity of oﬀshoring given zα (the skill level of the best worker that works for a
national ﬁrm). The reason is that, given zα, more agents decide to become workers and they
work for international ﬁrms. Of course, zα will change as well. As communication technology
improves, there is a direct and an indirect eﬀect on zα. The direct eﬀect increases zα since a
decrease in h increases the team sizes of national ﬁrms and therefore the number of workers
that work for national managers. However, an improvement in communication technology
increases z∗
W which has a negative eﬀect on zα: Less agents in the South decide to become
managers so they hire less workers. Hence the eﬀect of h on zα is, in principle, ambiguous.
The relationship that determines the increase or decrease in the quantity of oﬀshoring is the
proportional change of zα versus the proportional change in z∗
W. The next proposition shows
that both the proportion and the total number of workers in international ﬁrms increases
with an improvement in communication technology.
Proposition 4 The quantity of international oﬀshoring is weakly decreasing in communi-
cation costs (h). That is, the quantity of oﬀshoring increases with improvements in com-
munication technology. The number of workers engaged in oﬀshoring also decreases with
h.
Proposition 4 has an immediate corollary on the quality of oﬀshoring. As the quantity of
oﬀshoring increases, the average skill level of workers in international teams weakly decreases.
The reason is that a reduction in h leads to an improvement in the average quality of the
workers in both national and international ﬁrms. However, the increase in the quantity
of oﬀshoring implies that the increase is larger for national than for international teams:
International teams need to hire more workers and so they get workers that have lower skills
than other workers in international ﬁrms.
Corollary 5 The quality of oﬀshoring is weakly increasing in communication costs (h). That
is, the quality of oﬀshoring decreases with improvements in communication technology.
5.1.3 Matching and Firm Characteristics
We now turn to the eﬀect of improvements in communication technology on the characteristics
of ﬁrms. As we have discussed in the previous propositions, a decline in h implies that more
30agents in the world become workers. Hence, a fall in h improves the skill level of the less
skilled agent that decides to become a manager. Since these managers are always matched
with workers without skills, z =0 , the match of these workers improves. In contrast, the best
worker before the technological improvement was matched with the best manager in the world,
z =1 , and now is matched with a worse manager since some agents became workers after the
fall in h. Hence, the match of these workers worsens. Even though some of the managers in the
world economy are matched with less skilled workers after the improvement in communication
technology, we can show that the direct eﬀect of the technological improvement on ﬁrm size
dominates other eﬀects, thereby leading to an increase in the size of all ﬁrms in the economy.
We formalize these conclusions in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 A decrease in communication costs (h) has the following eﬀects on matching
and ﬁrm size:
(i) It improves the match for workers below a threshold skill level ϕ, while it worsens the
match for workers (that were already workers) above ϕ;
(ii) It increases the size of all ﬁrms.
5.1.4 Wage Inequality and Returns to Skill
So far we have analyzed improvements in communication technology on allocations, namely,
occupational choice, oﬀshoring, and ﬁrm characteristics. These changes are, of course, the
result of agents’ reactions to changes in equilibrium prices. The whole distribution of wages
and rents varies with an increase in h.
Concerning managerial rents, the implication of a technological change follows as a
straightforward corollary of the previous proposition. Since all ﬁrm sizes increase, and the
marginal return to skill of managers is equal to ﬁrm size, the marginal return to skill for
managers increases with improvements in communication technology.
Corollary 6 A decrease in communication costs (h) increases the marginal return to skill
of managers.
The eﬀect on the returns to worker skill is more complex. There are three components
determining the eﬀect of changes in h on the marginal return to skill of workers: the comple-
mentarity eﬀect, the competition eﬀect, and the occupational choice eﬀect.
First, the complementarity eﬀect is the eﬀect on the dispersion in the price of each unit
of skill. It is easy to see that the degree of convexity of the wage function in (12) and (17)
increases with h. Hence, as h declines, the increasing returns associated with possessing many
units of skill decrease. The reason is that as h decreases, team sizes increases and, therefore,
having more skills will not imply matching with a much better manager. This eﬀect decreases
the marginal return to skills of workers via a decrease in the dispersion in the price of units
31of skill. Hence, in our model this measure declines unambiguously with an improvement in
communication technology.
Second, consider the change in the baseline return to a unit of ability, as captured by σ1L
and σ1H: the competition eﬀect. As h decreases, all managers run larger ﬁrms and so the
demand for workers increases. Thus their units of skill are more valuable, which increases the
average wage per unit of skill. However, the total sign of the eﬀect on the σ0s is ambiguous,
since there is also a direct eﬀect of h on the σ’s that goes in the opposite direction.
Third, the set of workers in the world unambiguously increases. As a result, this occupa-
tional choice eﬀect increases the dispersion in the return to skill.
The following corollary summarizes these results
Summary 4 A decline in communication costs (h) has the following eﬀects on the wage
structure:
(i) It decreases the dispersion of the marginal return to skill of workers;
(ii) It has an ambiguous eﬀect on the baseline return to skill;
(iii) It increases the variance in worker skill, leading, everything else equal, to increases in
wage inequality.
5.2 The Skill Overlap
5.2.1 Occupational Choice
As α increases agents in the South become relatively more skilled. In a LQE an increase in
α decreases the supply of low skilled workers and increases the supply of high skilled ones.
This in turn tends to increase the size of ﬁrms (ﬁrms hiring more able workers are larger)
which increases the demand for workers’ skills and decreases the demand for managers’ skills.
Hence, the set of skills of agents that become workers increases and the set of agents that
become managers falls: an increase in z∗
W. After the increase in α, only the best agents
become managers. In a LQE, an increase in α also leads to an increase in the number of
workers in the North (all agents are workers in the South) and to a reduction in the number
of managers, or ﬁrm destruction. In a HQE, an increase in α has similar implications but
due to diﬀerent reasons. After an increase in α, the relative ability of the agents that become
workers does not change given occupational choices. The mass of workers decreases and the
mass of managers increases which implies that, to restore equilibrium, wages will adjust so
that more able agents decide to become workers: an increase in z∗
W. This change leads again
to an increase in the number of workers in the North. Conversely, the number of workers in
the South can be shown to decrease with α. The next proposition formalizes the result:
Proposition 6 The skill of the world’s most-skilled worker (z∗
W), is increasing in the skill
overlap (α). The number of workers in the South weakly decreases with α, whereas the number
of workers in the North increases with α. The number of managers in the South weakly
increases with α, whereas the number of managers in the North decreases with α.
325.2.2 The Quantity and Quality of Oﬀshoring
In a LQE all agents in the South work for foreign managers and so the quantity of oﬀshoring,
as deﬁned in Section 5.1.2, is always one. However, in a HQE, an increase in α leads to
a decrease in the quantity of oﬀshoring. The proportion of agents working in international
teams decreases as agents in the South become more skilled. Intuitively, as agents in the
South become more skilled, a larger proportion decide to become managers of national ﬁrms.
Their higher skill level allows them to leverage their knowledge enough to earn more as
managers of national ﬁrms than as workers of international ﬁrms. Of course, this has general
equilibrium consequences, there is competition for national workers which raises the wages
of low skilled workers thereby oﬀsetting some of the direct eﬀects. However, after taking all
these eﬀects into account, this simple logic still holds as we show in the next proposition.
Proposition 7 The quantity of international oﬀshoring is weakly decreasing in the skill over-
lap (α). That is, the quantity of oﬀshoring decreases as southern agents become more skilled.
The number of workers engaged in oﬀshoring also decreases with α.
The previous proposition has an immediate corollary on the eﬀect of α on the quality of
oﬀshoring. As the southern agents become more skilled the quality of oﬀshoring increases:
More productive and larger ﬁrms engage in oﬀshoring.
Corollary 7 The quality of oﬀshoring is weakly increasing in the skill overlap (α). That is,
the quality of oﬀshoring increases as southern agents become more skilled.
5.2.3 Matching and Firm Characteristics
Changes in the skill distribution of southern agents have distinct eﬀects on small versus large
ﬁrms. In particular, as α increases workers with low skill levels will now be matched with
better managers, and will thus work for more productive ﬁrms. In contrast, workers with
high skill levels will be matched with worse managers and so the productivity of the ﬁrms for
w h i c ht h e yw o r kw i l ld e c r e a s e .A sα increases, in a LQE, the ability distribution of workers
increases. This leads to larger teams, which in turn implies that the number of ﬁrms in the
world decreases, as discussed before. Only the most productive ﬁrms survive, or in other
words, only the agents with the highest skills decide to become managers. On the one hand,
this implies that the worst workers in the world now work for better managers. On the other
hand, the best workers before the change, that used to work for managers with z =1 ,n o w
work for worse managers since they are not the best workers anymore. In a HQE, an increase
in α implies that, given wages, there is an excess supply of managers, which reduces rents
and increases wages, therefore leading to more agents choosing to become workers.
These results on matching imply that the managers that ran small ﬁrms, and are still
managers after the change in α, hire worse workers. Therefore, their ﬁrms become smaller.
Conversely, the managers that used to run the largest ﬁrms now hire the workers that used
33to be managers. Since these workers are more skilled, these ﬁrms become larger. The same
reasoning leads to the expansion of large oﬀshoring ﬁrms and a contraction of small oﬀshoring
ﬁrms. The next proposition formalizes these claims.
Proposition 8 An increase in the skill overlap (α) has the following eﬀects on matching
and ﬁrm size:
(i) It improves the match for workers below a threshold skill level, while it worsens the
match for workers with skills above this threshold;
(ii) It increases the size of the largest ﬁrms and decreases the size of the smallest ﬁrms;
( i i i )I ti n c r e a s e st h es i z eo ft h el a r g e s to ﬀshorers and decreases the size of the smallest
oﬀshorers;
(iv) It increases the size of all non-oﬀshorers in a LQE, but decreases the size of all non-
oﬀshorers in a HQE.
5.2.4 Wage Inequality and Returns to Skill
Proposition 8 shows that the eﬀect of α on ﬁrm size is not the same for all ﬁrms. Since
t h es i z eo fﬁrms is identical to the marginal return to skill of managers this implies that we
cannot draw uniform conclusion on the eﬀect of α on the marginal return to skill of managers
(as we did for communication costs). We can, however, conclude that the marginal return to
skill of the worst managers decreases and the ma r g i n a lr e t u r nt os k i l lo ft h eb e s tm a n a g e r s
increases.
As in the case of communication costs, as the skill overlap (α) changes, we can observe
three changes in the structure of wages. First, there is the complementarity eﬀect. Again, this
eﬀect is captured by the quadratic term in both (12) and (17), which both weakly decrease
with α. The reason is that α decreases the population density of all skill levels in the South,
and skill levels of workers in the North that face competition from workers in the South. This
implies that a slightly better worker will now match with only a slightly better manager. The
diﬀerence in the skill level of the managers that these agents work for decreases with α, since
there are less workers at each skill level. Hence, an increase in α implies a drop in the
dispersion in the price of units of skills. This eﬀect is, as it was for h, unambiguous and may
be what empirical studies capture when they control for diﬀerent measures of ability or skills.
By itself it implies a decrease in wage inequality as a result of increases in α.
Second, consider the competition eﬀect. We can show that an increase in α increases both
σ1L and σ1H. The baseline return to the skill of workers in international or national ﬁrms
needs to go up, since workers became more skilled in a LQE, or workers are more scarce in
aH Q E .
Third, there is an occupational choice eﬀect. In a LQE an increase in α has a direct
eﬀect on the dispersion in the skill level of agents in the South, and from Proposition 6 we
know that in a HQE an increase in α also increases the dispersion. Hence, the occupational
34choice eﬀect always leads to an increase in wage inequality in the South.20 In the North,
Proposition 6 guarantees that this eﬀect increases wage inequality in both equilibria. The
following summarizes this discussion.
Summary 5 An increase in the skill overlap (α) has the following three eﬀects on the wage
structure:
(i) It decreases the dispersion of the marginal return to skill of workers;
(ii) It increases the baseline return to skill;
(iii) It increases the variance of worker skill, leading, everything else equal, to increases in
wage inequality.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have developed a theory of oﬀshoring in which agents with heterogenous abilities sort into
teams competitively. In our model, the distribution of skills in the population determines
both the types of teams that are formed and the wages that diﬀerent agents command. We
have interpreted globalization as a process that enables the formation of international teams
and that thereby aﬀects the distribution of agents available to form teams. From the point
of view of the North, globalization increases the mass of agents with relatively low ability,
while from the point of view of the South, globalization increases the mass of agents with
relatively high ability. We have analyzed the eﬀects of globalization on the organization of
work, the size distribution of ﬁrms, and the structure of earnings of individuals, and we have
illustrated how these outcomes in turn determine the patterns of production, consumption
and international trade in the global economy.
We have shown that the eﬀects of globalization interact in nontrivial ways with the state
of communication technologies. For example, in our model globalization always increases
within-worker wage inequality in the South, but it increases within-worker inequality in the
North only if the costs of communicating knowledge are relatively low. Similarly, we have
shown that the characteristics of international oﬀshoring also depend very much on the state
of communication technologies: the lower are communication costs, the higher is the amount
of international oﬀshoring, but the lower is its quality.
In order to highlight the main forces in the model, our theoretical framework has ab-
stracted from certain aspects that are central in shaping the international organization of
production. First, we have imposed that production is undertaken by two-layer teams con-
sisting of a manager and a set of workers. It would be interesting to incorporate the possibility
of both self-employment and multiple layers in our model. This would open the door for a
study of how globalization aﬀects the incentives to oﬀshore or not to diﬀerent countries, as
20This provides a rationale for the puzzling empirical results of Zhu and Treﬂer (2004), who found that, in
less-developed countries, an increase in the supply of skills is associated with higher wage inequality.
35well as the way it aﬀects the hierarchical structure of ﬁrms. Second, we have presented a
purely technological theory of the international organization of production. A caveat of this
approach is that we can explain why a northern manager might have an incentive to form a
team with a group of southern workers, but we have less to say about why this international
exchange of knowledge will occur within ﬁrm boundaries (i.e., within multinationals), rather
than through arm’s length subcontracting or licensing. It would be interesting to incorporate
contractual frictions in our setup in order to obtain a more well-deﬁned trade-oﬀ between
in-house versus arm’s-length oﬀshoring.21
Beyond providing a range of testable hypothesis concerning the relation between ﬁrm size,
inequality, and technology, our model points to some new avenues for empirical research. In
particular, it suggests that empirical analysis of the labor market must focus on three separate
channels through which the formation of international teams aﬀects the wage structure and
economic organization. First, what labor economists have normally called compositional
eﬀect, which is equivalent to the occupational choice eﬀect in our analysis — globalization
aﬀects the proportion of managers in the economy of each country — it increases it in the
North and decreases it in the South. Second, the competition eﬀect, typical of any equilibrium
model — globalization increases the relative supply of low skilled workers in the North (and
that of high skilled workers in the South), leading as a result to a drop in the unit skill prices
in the North and a raise in the South. Third, the complementarity eﬀect — globalization
increases the diﬀerence in ability between the manager assigned to a low and a high skill
worker, and as a result raises the diﬀerence between the marginal productivities of their
skills.
Empirical studies of wage inequality, which focus on the average price of a year of edu-
cation or experience, miss this third eﬀect, which is novel in our theory. The eﬀect could,
in principle, be captured empirically using data that includes organizational variables (such
as matched employee-employer data).22 These type of studies may contribute to illuminate
empirically the question that this paper addresses: to what extent the formation of cross-
country teams aﬀects the matches between workers and managers, changing the organization
of work and the returns to skills in the world.
21In a similar vein, Antràs (2003, 2005) and Antràs and Helpman (2004) embed the property-rights approach
of Grossman and Hart (1986) in standard trade models. Grossman and Helpman (2004) in turn develop a
model of the international organization of production that shares certain features with the multi-task approach
of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994).
22See also the empirical strategy in Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993)
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38Appendix A
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 :We ﬁrst show that an equilibrium of this economy exhibits positive sorting.
Let Π(zm,z p) denote the rents of a manager of ability zm and hires workers with ability zp. From
our deﬁnitions above, we know that Π(m(z),z)=R(m(z)) if m(·) is the equilibrium assignment














The numerator has to be negative since managers are maximizing rents in equilibrium. To show that


















Since the argument is valid for all workers, we conclude that in an equilibrium allocation m0 (z) > 0
for all workers with ability z.
Let w(·) be an equilibrium wage function, and let W (w) and M (w) be the equilibrium set of
agents that become workers and managers respectively. Let m(z) be the skill level of the manager of




(1 − z)g(z)dz =
Z
M∩[m(0),m(zp)]
g(z)dz all zp ∈ W.
Deriving with respect to zp we obtain that, as long as zp is in the interior of W and m(z) is increasing,
as we showed above,




We want to prove that an equilibrium in this economy implies that W (w) is a connected interval.
Suppose it is not. In particular, suppose W =[ a1,a 2] ∪ [a3,a 4] and M =[ a2,a 3] ∪ [a4,a 5]. Then,
given a1 and a3 we know that m(a1)=a2 and m(a2)=a3. Combining these conditions with the
diﬀerential equation for wages (and continuity of wages at a2)a n dt h ee x p r e s s i o na b o v e— t h a th a v et o
hold in the interior of W— we can solve for a wage function w13, a rent function R13 and a threshold a2.
Similarly, given a3 and a5 we can solve for a wage function w35,ar e n tf u n c t i o nR35 and a threshold a4
that satisfy all the equilibrium conditions in the interval [a3,a 5]. In order for W and M to represent
equilibrium occupational choices, we have to guarantee that agents in the interval [a3,a 5] do not want
39to form teams with agents in the interval [a1,a 3]. The ﬁrst necessary condition is that
R13 (a3)=w35 (a3).
Since, if R13 (a3) >w 35 (a3) agents with skills above but arbitrarily close to a3 would like to become
managers. If R13 (a3) <w 35 (a3) agents with skills marginally below a3 would like to become workers


















by the envelope theorem. We will prove that the inequality above has to hold in equilibrium in two
distinct cases: for the case when w13 (a2) ≥ a2 and for the case when w13 (a2) <a 2. Suppose that
w13 (a2) ≥ a2, then, since ∂R13 (z)/∂z > 1 for all z ∈ [a2,a 3], we know that R13 (a3) >a 3 and since













which proves condition (A.1) if w13 (a2) ≥ a2. Now suppose that w13 (a2) <a 2, then, since w35 (a3)=




a4 − w35 (a3)
1 − a3
=
a4h(1 − a2) − a3 + w13 (a2)
(1 − a3)h(1 − a2)
.
Proving that condition (A.1) holds then amounts to prove that
a4h(1 − a2)+w13 (a2) < 1
or
a4 <
1 − w13 (a2)
h(1 − a2)
.
B u tt h i si st r i v i a l l ys a t i s ﬁed given that a4 < ¯ z ≤ 1, and w13 (a2) <a 2.
We have established that condition (A.1) has to hold in equilibrium, but then a4 would like to
hire a3 −ε at a better wage than what he makes as a manager, and a3 −ε would accept the oﬀer. To
show this, consider the rents that a4 would get from hiring a3 − ε at wage R13 (a3 − ε),
Π(a4,a 3 − ε)=
a4 − R13 (a3 − ε)













where the inequality comes from the result above. Hence, an allocation where W is not connected
implies that there are incentives for agents to form diﬀerent teams. This implies that an equilibrium
requires that W be a connected interval of the form [0,z∗]. Hence, in equilibrium m(0) = z∗ and
40m(z∗)=¯ z. An allocation that (i) satisﬁes the two diﬀerential equations above, (ii) satisﬁes the pre-
vious boundary conditions for assignment function m, and (iii) yields a continuous earnings function,
exists and is unique (see Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2003), but basically there always exists a
solution and we have the same number of equations as variables to determine).
The ﬁnal step is to prove that such an allocation is in fact an equilibrium. For this we need to
prove that there exists an h∗ > 0 such that the allocation guaranteed to exist by the above reasoning
is such that R0 (z∗) >w 0 (z∗). To show this we use a similar argument to the one above. Consider the
incentives of a manager with ability ¯ z to hire a worker with ability z∗ + ε.H e rp r o ﬁts are given by
Π(¯ z,z∗ + ε)=
¯ z − R(z∗ + ε)




∂Π(¯ z,z∗ + ε)
∂ε
=
w(z∗) − R0 (x∗)
h(1 − z∗)
,
since R(z∗)=w(z∗). Hence, in equilibrium it has to be the case that R0 (z∗) >w 0 (z∗) in order for
this term to be negative. But notice that, since R(z∗)=w(z∗),
w0 (z∗)=
¯ z − w(z∗)
1 − z∗ =
h¯ z − z∗ + w(0)
(1 − z∗)h
which is smaller than 1/h if h¯ z +w(0) < 1. Hence, since w(0) < 1 (if not rents of all managers would





Hence, for all h<h ∗, there exists a unique competitive equilibrium in this economy. Given that
markets are complete and competitive, this implies that the equilibrium allocation in the economy is
Pareto Optimal.









h(1 − m−1 (zm))
2 > 0,
where the last inequality follows from positive sorting.¥
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) We ﬁrst show that the mass of workers increases in the South. This
is obviously the case in a LQE, because z∗
S <α<z ∗
WL.23 On the other hand, for the case of a HQE,
it suﬃces to show that z∗
S <z ∗
WH, but this follows from simple inspection of the formulas for these





which are both clearly true from the expressions for these thresholds.
(ii) For the ﬁrst statement we want to show that both mS (z) <m WL(z) and mS (z) <m WH(z)




WL, but these are inconsistent with the existence of a LQE.
41for all z ≤ z∗
S.T h e ﬁrst inequality follows directly from z∗
WL >z ∗
S in a LQE. Similarly, z∗
WH >z ∗
S
immediately implies that mS (z) <m WH(z) for z ≤ zα.F o rt h ei n t e r v a lzα <z<z ∗
WH,i ti su s e f u lt o




















then follows from z∗
WH >z ∗





is non-decreasing in x for x ∈ [0,1].T h e
second statement is an immediate corollary of this ﬁrst result. For the third statement, it is suﬃcient
to show that mWH(z∗
S) >αfor all z∗
S <z<z ∗





S) >α , and the result follows from the monotonicity of mWH(·).24
(iii) To prove the ﬁrst part, we simply write mW (z) − mN (z) for each of the two equilibria. For
the LQE one, this equals





























> 0 is implied by mN (z∗
WL) < 1). For the HQE case, this equals



















if zα <z<z ∗
WH
,
which is again non-decreasing in z, is negative for low enough z and is positive for high enough z
(the latter is implied by mN (z∗
WH) < 1). The second part follows immediately, since the matching
functions are monotonic and thus invertible. That is, at the same point at which workers are matched
with better managers, managers are matched with worse workers. See Figure 4 for an illustration. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :Let us start with the last claim. The diﬀerence in the marginal return
to skill in the South with and without globalization is given by
σ1L − σS + h
αz if 0 <z<αand h<
2(1−α)
2+α−α2,




σ1H − σS if 0 <z<z α and h>
2(1−α)
2+α−α2,
σ1H − σS + h




It is thus suﬃcient to show that σ1L >σ S and σ1H >σ S.T h a tσ1L >σ S follows directly from the























where the inequality follows since the ﬁrst term is increasing in z∗
WH and z∗
WH >z ∗
S, and the second
term is positive. This result, combined with z∗
WH >z ∗
S, implies that wage inequality in the South































































1+h2 (3 − α) − 1
h2p
1+h2 (3 − α)
< 0,






















where the sign follows from
(1 + h + α − hα)











The conclusions on the set of workers and managers follow directly from this result and the deﬁnitions
of a LQE and HQE.¥












That is, the quantity of oﬀshoring is the proportion of southern workers in international teams. The
quantity of workers engaged in oﬀshoring is in turn given by α in a LQE and by z∗
WH−zα in a HQE.
We ﬁrst prove the ﬁrst statement of the Proposition, namely, that z∗
WH − zα i sad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o n
of h. Towards a contradiction, suppose that z∗
WH − zα is a weakly increasing function of h. Then,
the number of workers hired by northern managers in [α,1] weakly increases with h. But as we show






)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nh for any
skill level zm of the manager. Hence, since the number of managers in [α,1] has not changed, the
number of workers in their ﬁrms must have gone down: A contradiction. Hence z∗









Moving to the ﬁrst statement of the Proposition, notice that since zα <z ∗










and thus zα/zW is increasing in h. This in turn implies that the quantity of oﬀshoring is weakly
decreasing in h. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :From Proposition (3), a decrease in h increases z∗
W,s a yf r o mz∗
W0 to
z∗
W1. From the boundary condition mW (0) = z∗
W, it follows that the worst agent is matched with a
better manager. Similarly, the boundary condition mW (z∗
W)=1 , implies that the match for workers
with zp = z∗
W0 worsens. It remains to show that the change in the match is a monotonic function
of the skill of the worker. But simple inspection of the formulas for mWL(zp) and mWH(zp) reveals





is increasing in zp. To prove the second claim we






increases in h for all zm in [z∗
W,1]. This amounts to computing
these partial derivatives for each segment of each equilibrium and showing they are positive. Simple
but tedious derivation conﬁr m st h i sc l a i m .¥
























The last two statements follow from this result as well as from the fact that z∗






WH) ,a ss h o w ni nt h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 . ¥




















































and so ∂ (zα/z∗


















α+1 (2h + α − 2hα + h2 + h2α +1 )
´
where
υ1 (h,α)=( α +1 )








2h +2 α +2 hα + h2 + α2 − 2hα2 +2 h2α + h2α2 +1
¢
.
Now note that υ1 (h,α) >υ 2 (h,α) if and only if
(υ1 (h,α))
2 − (υ2 (h,α))
2 =4 α2h
¡
h +2 α + h2 + α2 − 2hα2 +2 h2α + h2α2 +1
¢
> 0,






which implies from the deﬁnition of OW that the quantity of oﬀshoring is strictly decreasing in α.
Finally, we next want to show that the measure of workers engaged in oﬀshoring also decreases



























































































∂α as well as mWH(zα)=α. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 :Again, making use of the boundary conditions as well ∂z∗
WL/∂α > 0,
it is straightforward to see that the least-skilled worker is matched with a better manager, while the
ex-ante most-skilled worker is matched with worse manager. For claim (i), it remains to show that
the change in the match is a monotonic function of the skill of the worker, i.e. ∂2mW (zp)/∂α∂z ≤ 0.






increasing in zp. Hence, for each equilibrium, there exist a thresholds ϕi <z ∗
Wj, j = H,L, such that
all workers with z<ϕ j are matched with a better manager, while all workers with z>ϕ j are matched
with a worse manager.




are matched with lower-




are matched with higher-skilled workers.







For claims (iii) and (iv), notice that ∂2mWL(z)/∂α∂z =0for α<z<z ∗
WL which implies
(given the eﬀect on the boundary agents) that 0 <ϕ L <α . Similarly, ∂2mWH(z)/∂α∂z =0for
0 <z p <z α implies that zα <ϕ H <z ∗
WH. By the monotonicity of mW (z), these inequalities in
turn imply z∗
WL <m WL(ϕL) <m WL(α) and α<m WH(ϕH) < 1. To see that this is suﬃcient for
claims (iii) and (iv) simply remember that the interval of managers that oﬀshore in each equilibrium
is (z∗




In this appendix we formally prove that the assumption that managers hire only one type of worker
is without loss of generality.
Lemma B.1 A particular manager cannot be matched with an interval of workers.
Proof: Suppose instead that the assignment function is such that for some interval with positive




a contradiction. Note that this is simply a restriction imposed by measurability. ¥
45Thus it follows that the problem of a manager who hires the set of workers A = {z1,z 2...,zn} can
be written as:














Moreover, we can obtain λ quite simply from the time constraint:
ni(zm − w(zi)) = λni(h(1 − zi))
and taking sums on both sides and using 1=h
m X
i=1
(1 − zi)ni, we have that:
m X
i=1
ni (zm − w(zi)) = λ.
Thus λ = R(zm).
The ﬁrst order condition says that for all worker types, the output provided by that worker type
must be identical. The second condition says that the marginal value of a particular worker type
must be equal to the marginal cost for the manager to not want to hire that particular worker type.
These conditions immediately imply that a particular worker type may not be matched with several
diﬀerent managers.
Lemma B.2 A particular worker type may not be matched with several diﬀerent managers.
Proof: Suppose that a particular worker type maybe matched with several alternative manager

























Intuitively, for a worker type to be matched with several diﬀerent managers, it is necessary that the
slope and the level of the wage function at that particular spot is identical; but, by complementarity,
the marginal value of the worker matched with the better manager type is higher, so the marginal
46cost (the wage slope); which yields the contradiction.
Thus the correspondence M(z) is in fact a single valued function, that delivers a manager zm for
each worker type zi.As the next lemma shows, this function is also continuous.
Lemma B.3 T h em a t c h i n gf u n c t i o nM(z) is continuous.
Proof: The solution to (B.1) exists for all zm, since it is the maximization of a continuous function
over a compact set. Thus the maximizers zi and ni also vary continuously with zm. ¥
Lemma B.4 M(z) is one to one — that is each manager hires strictly one worker type.
Proof: Suppose that it does not. In particular, suppose it hires two worker types, z1 and z2. The




Hence the manager is indiﬀerent in hiring any worker z ∈ [z1,z 2] if
˜ w(z)=w(z1)+λh(z − z1).
And, since the manager is hiring z1 and z2, we know that
w(z2)=˜ w(z2)=w(z1)+λh(z2 − z1).
Since the manager is hiring only these two types of workers, we know that the wage function in
between has to be larger than ˜ w(z) (if it was smaller the manager would prefer to hire any of these
workers, and if it was equal it would hire them as well). Hence the wage function has to be such that
w(z) > ˜ w(z) all z ∈ [z1,z 2].
Since w(z2)= ˜ w(z2), the slope of the wage function has to be higher than λh for some interval H
and lower for some other interval L. Now take a manager zH
m hiring workers in H,a n dl e tt h es l o p e





be given by s>h λ . Then, zH
m is












But notice that this implies that












m will have an incentive to hire the workers of type z2, and oﬀer them
a wage of w(z2)+ε for ε small enough. A contradiction with the assertion that zm hires workers of
type z2. Hence since the ﬁrst lemma above prevents managers from hiring an interval of workers, and
the argument goes through for arbitrary z1 and z2, managers hire only one type of workers. ¥
47